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Take the Fifth . . . Please!: The Original Insignificance
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause
Gary Lawson∗
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause adds nothing to
the Constitution’s original meaning. Every principle for limiting federal
executive, judicial, and even legislative powers that can plausibly be
attributed to the idea of “due process of law”—from the principle of
legality forbidding executive or judicial action in the absence of law, to
the requirement of notice before valid judicial judgments, to the
limitation on arbitrary governmental action that today goes under the
heading of “substantive due process”—is already contained in the text
and structure of the Constitution of 1788. The Fifth Amendment Due
Process of Law Clause confirms those principles but does not create them.
Accordingly, originalist attention should be focused on the 1788
Constitution itself, not on the “exclamation point” added to it in 1791.
This Article defends those claims and briefly explores why and how
modern doctrine has moved from this substantively oriented account of
limitations on governmental powers to a focus on executive and judicial
procedures. That shift in focus from substance to process may result in
some measure from doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause. The limitations on federal power built into the
Constitution of 1788 obviously do not apply to state governments, so
attributing the Fifth Amendment’s meaning to the Fourteenth
Amendment makes little sense (though if that is really what the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, that is just life). A
proceduralist account of due process of law makes some sense under the
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Fourteenth Amendment, but it is a large mistake to read that
proceduralist account back into the Fifth Amendment.
The bottom lines are that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause (1) is much more about substance than about procedure and (2)
is basically irrelevant to the Constitution’s original meaning.
CONTENTS
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Due Process of Law Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments appear to pose some vexing interpretative problems for
constitutional originalists. 1 Initially, there is the question whether the
two clauses, enacted seventy-seven years apart, have the same meaning
or whether each provision calls for a distinct interpretative exercise. 2

1. They may well pose vexing interpretative problems for non-originalists as well,
depending on the content of the non-originalist theory, but those problems are not my
concern here.
2. Compare Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120
YALE L.J. 408 (2010) (suggesting that substantive due process might be a plausible
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment but is not a plausible interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment), with Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1777–78 (2012) (“There is nothing in the legislative or ratification
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to suggest that it was understood to operate against states
any differently than due process clauses had since the early days of the Republic.”). The Supreme
Court once intimated that there might be differences in the meanings of the two provisions, see
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328 (1901) (“While the language of those
amendments is the same, yet as they were engrafted upon the Constitution at different times
and in widely different circumstances of our national life, it may be that questions may arise in
which different constructions and applications of their provisions may be proper.”), but
immediately backed off from any implications of that suggestion. See id. at 329 (“[W]e . . . shall
proceed, in the present case, on the assumption that the legal import of the phrase ‘due process
of law’ is the same in both Amendments. Certainly, it cannot be supposed that, by the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was intended to impose on the States, when exercising their powers
of taxation, any more rigid or stricter curb than that imposed on the Federal government, in a
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Focusing solely for the moment on the text of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process of Law Clause, which says that no person shall “be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” 3 one
immediately encounters tricky questions about the meaning of the
phrase “life, liberty, or property.” Does the word “life” bear the
relatively expansive meaning given by William Blackstone of “a
person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation,” 4 or does it implicate only capital
punishment or other existence-ending governmental actions? Does
“liberty” mean anything more than freedom of locomotion 5 and, if
so, how much more? Does “property” refer to land, land plus chattels,
all interests recognized as property by general common law in 1791,
or interests that can include expectations of future government
benefits? 6 There are also questions about the meaning of the phrase
“without due process of law.” Does “without due process of law”
invoke only long-established prohibitions on rights-affecting
executive or judicial action undertaken without legal authority7 or
proper form? 8 Or does it mean whatever procedures are fair under all
of the facts and circumstances of a particular case, 9 or the product of

similar exercise of power, by the Fifth Amendment.”). In order to address this question
adequately, one would need to determine, inter alia, whether amendments to the Constitution
should be understood in light of the same interpretative norms and baselines that guide
interpretation of the original Constitution, which is emphatically a topic for another day.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
5. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2632–33 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (finding that a historic reading makes it “hard to see how the ‘liberty’ protected by
the [Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause could be interpreted to include anything broader
than freedom from physical restraint”).
6. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 557–77 (1972) (explaining,
in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, that constitutional “property” interests can
include expectations of receipt of future benefits in some cases).
7. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276 (1856); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 841–42 (7th ed. 2016).
8. See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process
of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975).
9. See Gary Lawson et al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”:
Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 7–15 (2005) (describing, without endorsing, this case-law interpretation of due process
of law).
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some kind of narrow, utilitarian calculus, 10 or something more
substantive that serves as a font of protection against even prospective
legislation? 11 One might also wonder what it means to be “deprived”
of life, liberty, or property. Does this term connote some kind of
intentionality, or will mere negligence suffice for a deprivation? 12
Finally, one might ask who or what counts as a “person” protected by
the clause. Does that term extend to juridical persons such as
corporations, to human beings who are not yet born, or both? 13
These questions are vitally important for anyone interested in realworld doctrine. They might well be important for understanding the
original interpretative meaning 14 of the Due Process of Law Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But to ask those questions in the context
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause is fruitless
for the simple reason that the clause itself is irrelevant to
the Constitution’s original interpretative meaning. 15 The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause adds virtually nothing to,

10. See id. at 15–23 (describing, without endorsing, this case-law interpretation of due
process of law).
11. For a compendium of the various possible meanings of “substantive” due process,
see John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV.
493 (1997).
12. The Supreme Court, after vacillating for a few years, settled on requiring
intentionality, or at least recklessness, for a constitutional deprivation. See Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986).
13. On the assumption that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have the same
meaning in this regard, current law says “yes” with respect to corporations, see Santa Clara Cty.
v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), and “not really” with respect to the unborn, see Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). This Article takes no position on either conclusion. For a
thoughtful article exploring the latter issue, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of
Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2013).
14. By “interpretative” meaning I mean the communicative content of the words used
in the text. Legal actors often employ the word “meaning” in very different senses to describe,
for example, the effect that those words are or should be given in adjudicative actions, which
may be only contingently, if at all, related to the words’ communicative meaning. On the
difference between interpretative, or communicative, meaning and adjudicative, or normative,
meaning, see Gary Lawson, Did Justice Scalia Have a Theory of Interpretation?, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2143, 2155–58 (2017).
15. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 99
(describing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause as irrelevant and trivial, but for
somewhat different reasons than are outlined here). The adjective “original” in the context of
interpretative, or communicative, meaning is redundant, and I will henceforth ordinarily omit it
unless it is necessary for clarity. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or: Could
Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460–62 (2016).
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and subtracts nothing from, the meaning of the Constitution of 1788.
As with most provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is an “exclamation
point” 16 that highlights certain legal norms but does not create or
change them.
This claim should not be at all startling. The Federalists in 1787
consistently maintained that a bill of rights more extensive than the
one found in Article I, Section 9 of the original constitutional text was
unnecessary and would only give rise to false implications about the
scope of national power because the Constitution of 1788 gave
institutions of the national government no power to violate the various
rights specified in the amendments. 17 To them, the Bill of Rights was
redundant with limitations on national powers already found in the
text and structure of the Constitution. To be sure, a great
many Antifederalists strongly disagreed, and ultimately disagreed
successfully, about the need for a more robust bill of rights, but their
insistence on the importance of an additional bill of rights was based
largely on an exaggerated view of the powers of Congress, especially
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, that does not withstand
close scrutiny. 18 The Antifederalists were right about a great many
things, quite possibly including the wisdom of having a national
government in the first place, but the Federalists were right about this
interpretative point. 19
While there are certain features of the enacted 1791 Bill of Rights
that arguably refine or clarify the pre-existing legal order to some
degree 20 or extend some 1788 prohibitions on national power to the

16. See Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. RICH. L. REV.
511 (1999).
17. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585,
635–36 (2009); Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 477–79 (2008).
18. See GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
(2010) (describing various strands of thought on the Necessary and Proper Clause, all of which
converge on the idea that the clause is a limited rather than unlimited grant of power).
19. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 534–35 (1871) (vindicating the Federalists’
fears about false implications of federal power that might be drawn from a bill of rights).
20. The Sixth and Seventh Amendments arguably add a measure of specificity to preexisting norms regarding jury trials. See Lawson, supra note 17, at 489–90. The first two
amendments in the Bill of Rights proposed by the first Congress, neither of which secured the
necessary votes for ratification in 1791, would have made substantive changes to the
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governance of federal territories, 21 the ratification of the Bill of Rights
made very few alterations to the legal landscape. Outside of federally
governed territory or the District of Columbia, 22 virtually nothing
that was constitutional on December 14, 1791, suddenly became
unconstitutional on December 15, 1791. This is particularly true with
respect to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. That
clause simply reflects ideas that were already fully incorporated into
the constitutional text of 1788.
A principal vehicle for incorporating those ideas of due process of
law into the constitutional text is the scheme of separation of powers.
Nathan Chapman and Mike McConnell have recently argued that the
ideas of separation of powers and due process of law grew together, so
that the original-meaning content of “due process of law” is driven in
considerable measure, if not wholly, by principles of separation of
powers. 23 That is partly but not entirely right. The ideas most centrally
identified with due process of law are indeed separation-of-powers
ideas, which is a principal reason why the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause is redundant. The proper conclusion, however,
is not that one therefore should interpret the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause in light of separation of powers principles, but

Constitution. The original proposed second amendment, postponing the effectiveness of any
congressional pay raise until after the next election, failed to secure enough votes for ratification
in 1791 but was ratified as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment in 1992. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives,
shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.”). The original
proposed first amendment contained a complicated formula for altering the size of congressional
districts; it failed to pass by one vote. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 14–17 (1998).
21. The enacted First Amendment (the original proposed third amendment), for
example, prevents Congress from passing laws respecting establishments of religion in federally
governed territory. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Prior to December 15, 1791, Congress could
presumably have used its powers under the Territories Clause or the District Clause, which are
the powers of a general rather than limited government, to establish religion in federal territory.
That power vanished when the First Amendment became law.
22. Concededly, this is a rather large area. At the time of the founding, about forty
percent of the country was federally owned territory. Much of that territory, however, was
sparsely populated, so the raw geographical numbers are somewhat misleading.
23. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 272
(1985) (“[C]onsiderable historical evidence supports the position that ‘due process of law’ was
a separation-of-powers concept designed as a safeguard against unlicensed executive action,
forbidding only deprivations not authorized by legislation or common law.”).
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that one should not interpret the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clause at all. 24 Originalists are well advised to spend their time
and energy examining the Constitution of 1788 rather than the
exclamation point added to it in 1791.
Once one focuses on the Constitution of 1788 as the proper
object of interpretation, some perhaps surprising results emerge. In
particular, the ideas that today fall under the heading of “substantive
due process” acquire a new significance for originalists, albeit in a
different form and from a different source than modern proponents
of that doctrine invoke. For those who are tempted to see a term such
as “substantive due process” as an oxymoron, 25 one must not let
familiar labels drive judgment. As Timothy Sandefur has rightly
emphasized, the clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
not really “due process” clauses, and it is potentially seriously
misleading to refer to them as such. They are “due process of law”
clauses. 26 As an original matter, as we will see, due process of law is
often about substance far more than it is about procedure. The same
is accordingly true of the principles of lawful executive and judicial
(and perhaps legislative) action incorporated into the original
Constitution that are repeated and reflected in the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process of Law Clause.
Parts II through IV of this Article show how the text and structure
of the Constitution of 1788 lay out norms of legality, notice, and the
forms of executive and judicial action that were emphasized and
reaffirmed in, but not constitutionally created by, the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. Part V briefly explores
whether the original Constitution contains norms of substantive
rationality, akin to “substantive due process,” that place limits on
Congress. The answer, perhaps surprisingly from an originalist
perspective, is yes because of basic principles of fiduciary law that serve

24. The familiar interpretative canon that warns against construing language to be useless
has much less application across provisions in the Constitution than it does across terms within
a specific provision. The Constitution contains a significant number of clauses that are
substantively redundant, no doubt as a precaution against making faulty inferences or
assumptions. See Lawson, supra note 17, at 485–89.
25. See Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
253 (2016) (collecting references).
26. See, e.g, Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of
Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 286 (2012).
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as background interpretative norms for the Constitution. If the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause is properly construed to
impose substantive restraints on legislation—and this Article is
officially agnostic on (if unofficially skeptical about) that precise
interpretative point—any such restraints merely replicate and
emphasize limits that are already built into the original Constitution.
Part VI of this Article, with considerable trepidation, comments
on the quite different significance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process of Law Clause, which is possibly far more powerful than
legal doctrine has ever recognized. The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause may be constitutionally insignificant for
originalists, but the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause is most decidedly significant, both doctrinally and as a matter
of original meaning, though figuring out the exact original meaning
is a tough nut that I leave largely to others to crack. While it is not my
mission to present an authoritative account of the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, or anything
else having to do with the Fourteenth Amendment, I offer what I
hope is a fresh look at some of the key cases in the half-century
following the Civil War in order to help explain why modern due
process doctrine, which focuses on executive and judicial hearings,
looks so very different from an eighteenth-century conception of due
process of law, which looks to executive and judicial (and possibly
legislative) lawfulness.
My goal throughout this Article is descriptive, not normative. I
aim to uncover the original meaning—or, rather, non-meaning—of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, to provide a
framework for exploring the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, and to suggest how and
why legal doctrine has buried the former. These last two tasks are
approached gingerly and tentatively; it would require a lengthy book
to sort through them properly. In particular, when it comes to the
Fourteenth Amendment, I seek more to suggest lines for future
inquiry than to provide clear answers.
II. THE LAW OF THE LAND AS THE LAW OF LEGALITY
What would be the significance or meaning of “due process of
law” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries? For that,
we must start in the thirteenth century. More precisely, we must start
618
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with what eighteenth century thinkers and leaders thought about what
seventeenth century thinkers and leaders thought about thirteenth
century writings. 27
Article 39 of the 1215 Magna Carta famously provided that “[n]o
free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or
exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” 28 The
reissuance of the Great Charter in 1225 similarly provided:
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law
of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any
man either Justice or Right. 29

The “we” promising not to do any of these things was a very royal
“we”—namely, the King. This Article of Magna Carta is a disavowal
of royal, or executive, authority; “here the King acknowledged that
his mere dictates are not the law.” 30 To be sure, one must be careful
not to read modern notions of separated governmental powers,
including categories such as “executive” and “judicial,” into a
thirteenth-century instrument. The thirteenth century did not sharply
differentiate executive from judicial power. Even seventeenth-century
27. Even more precisely, we need to know what eighteenth century thinkers and leaders
thought about what seventeenth century thinkers and leaders thought about what thirteenth
century thinkers and leaders thought about eleventh century writings. The words of Magna
Carta that gave rise to the idea of due process of law did not spring full blown from the minds
of thirteenth-century English barons (or perhaps from the mind of a thirteenth-century English
king, if Article 39 of Magna Carta was really a pro-royalist provision, see J.C. HOLT, MAGNA
CARTA 328–30 (2d ed. 1992)). Those words had antecedents in the law of the Holy Roman
Empire of the eleventh century. See RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1–2 (1926).
28. HOLT, supra note 27, at 461.
29. 9 Hen. III, ch. 29 (1225). For those who do not trust translators, the original Latin
version of the text is:
Nullus liber homo decetero capiatur vael imprisonetur aut disseisiatur de aliquo libero
tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suis, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur
aut aliquo alio modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittemus, nisi
per legale judicium parium suorum, vel per legem terre.
1215: Magna Carta (Latin and English), ONLINE LIBR. LIBERTY, http://oll.liberty
fund.org/pages/1215-magna-carta-latin-and-engish (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).
30. Timothy Sandefur, Lex Terrae 800 Years On: The Magna Carta’s Legacy Today, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 759, 760 (2015).
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thinkers like John Locke thought of judicial power as an aspect of
executive power. 31 Furthermore, a distinction between executive and
legislative power was, at best, hazy at the time of Magna Carta. 32 Still,
the object of the provision was to place limitations on the power of
the King. That is a big deal.
The interests protected by this provision were interests of property
and natural liberty. The historical contours of these interests in the
thirteenth century are not relevant to my inquiry. What matters is how
an eighteenth-century author would use those terms, and that
depends more on the seventeenth century than on the thirteenth. Sir
Edward Coke defined the terms in this Article of Magna Carta in
expansive fashion, perhaps more expansively than they were intended
to be read in 1215 or 1225. While “disseisin” literally refers only to
loss of real property, Lord Coke wrote that the term intended “that
lands, tenements, goods, and chattells shall not be seised into the
Kings hands, contrary to this great Charter, and the Law of the
Land.” 33 Being “ruined” or “destroyed,” said Coke, includes being
put to death. 34 Thus, the interests identified in this provision of Magna
Carta, as understood by Coke, are very well encapsulated by the
phrase “life, liberty, or property.” And Coke’s understanding is the
most important element for grasping the likely eighteenth-century
meaning of these terms, as it is from Coke’s understanding that people
in the eighteenth century primarily acquired their beliefs about
Magna Carta. 35
Although there is some risk of anachronism in applying a term
such as “separation of powers” to Magna Carta, Article 39 of the
charter, in either of its original thirteenth-century forms, can fairly be

31. See Suri Ratnapla, John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Re-evaluation,
38 AM. J. JURIS. 189, 204–05 (1993).
32. See MOTT, supra note 27, at 42–44.
33. 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 850 (Steve
Sheppard ed., 2005).
34. See id. at 853.
35. See MOTT, supra note 27, at 78 (“While it is undoubtedly true that the Institutes
leave much to be desired from the point of view of historical research, it really mattered little if
it were historically accurate or not. The important thing is that the Institutes were regarded as
accurate and consequently had a tremendous influence upon subsequent interpretations of
Magna Carta.”). For more on Coke’s influence in the eighteenth century, see id. at 79, 89–90;
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2, at 1681 (describing Coke’s influence as “unparalleled”).
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described as a kind of separation-of-powers provision, in that it denied
the King the ability to act in the absence of law from another source
when such action would result in loss of property, imprisonment, or
other criminal punishment imposed on the King’s subjects. More
abstractly: according to Magna Carta, executive enforcement action
resulting in loss of life, liberty, or property can take place only pursuant
to general norms of conduct (“the law of the land”) or after
determination by an institution other than the executive (“the lawful
judgment of his peers”). 36 Thus, “a 1368 royal commission to two
men to seize and imprison another and take his goods . . . [was]
held . . . void . . . because it authorized the commissioners ‘to take a
man and his goods without indictment, suit of a party, or
due process.’”37
The idea that action depriving subjects of rights requires law to
validate it is important enough to warrant a label. In this Article, I call
this idea the “principle of legality.” 38 This fundamental principle
infuses the Constitution of 1788. It was there in the Constitution in
the three-and-a-half years before the Fifth Amendment was ratified,

36. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2, at 1683–84. Quite possibly, the original
understanding of this provision was that lawful deprivations required both the law of the land
and a judgment of peers rather than either/or. See MOTT, supra note 27, at 3 n.8. Again,
however, Coke’s contrary understanding is surely the most relevant one for interpreting the
federal Constitution, and the weight of scholarly authority supports reading the provision in
Magna Carta in the alternative.
37. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 136 (2014).
38. In the Anglo-American tradition, the term “principle of legality” carries multiple
meanings, ranging from the idea that criminal punishment requires pre-existing positive law, see
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L.
REV. 189, 190 (1985), to the idea that statutes should not lightly be construed to derogate from
the common law, see, e.g., Dan Meagher, The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule:
Significance and Problems, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 413, 413–14 (2014), to a general statement of
the rule of law and the protection of fundamental common law rights, see Douglas E. Edlin,
From Ambiguity to Legality: The Future of English Judicial Review, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 396–
97 (2004). (I gather that in international law the term is essentially synonymous with the
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws. See, e.g., John Hasnas, Once More unto the Breach: The
Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 38 (2002).) I am using the term in precisely the sense described in the text:
the idea that governmental action is valid only when it is implementing lawful authority.
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and it remains in the Constitution today, embodied in some of the
document’s most basic structural features.
The key structural feature of the American Constitution is the
enumeration of limited institutional powers. The Constitution
identifies institutions of the national government and then grants
those institutions specific and delineated powers. “All legislative
powers herein granted” are vested in Congress; the “executive Power”
is vested in the President, and the “judicial Power” is vested in Article
III courts. 39 There are some modest tweaks to this basic distribution:
the President is given the legislative-like presentment and veto
power, 40 the Congress is given the seemingly judicial power of
impeachment, 41 the Senate shares in the executive appointment and
treaty-making powers, 42 and the courts are permitted to receive the
executive power of appointment in some cases. 43 But the default
scheme of the Constitution is to identify distinctive powers of
government and to parcel out those powers to different institutions.
Federal institutions can act only pursuant to the powers with which
they are vested and any powers that are incidental to those expressly
granted powers. 44
This scheme places a great deal of weight on the appropriate
definitions of legislative, executive, and judicial power. The
Constitution contains no express definitions of those terms. Nor can

39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1.
40. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3. One cannot call this power strictly “legislative” because the
Article I vesting clause declares that all legislative powers are vested in Congress, which does not
include the President. Accordingly, no presidential power can bear the label “legislative” within
the Constitution.
41. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
42. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
43. See id.
44. The scope of those incidental powers is a topic for another time. The question, for
example, whether there are powers ancillary to the case-deciding power that necessarily vest in
the federal courts is daunting. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme
Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 353–66 (2006); James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and
the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1500–11
(2000); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 843–66 (2001). For a treatment of incidental legislative
powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”:
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 78–103 (2017).
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one readily find canonical definitions in founding-era materials.
Indeed, as James Madison put it:
Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science of
government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the legislative,
executive, and judiciary . . . . Questions daily occur in the course of
practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects,
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science. 45

That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison
from categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in
their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.” 46 Nor did it stop
John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an
unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every society
natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive authorities
are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws depend entirely on
a separation of them in the frame of government.”47 Nor did it prevent
many state constitutions of the founding era from including
separation-of-powers clauses that expressly distinguished, again
without express definitions, legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. 48 Nor did it prevent the United States Constitution from
basing its entire scheme of governance on the distinctions between
those powers. However difficult it may be at the margins to
distinguish the categories of power from each other, the founding
generation assumed that there was a fact of the matter about those
distinctions and that one could discern that fact in at least a large range
of cases. The communicative meaning of the Constitution of 1788
cannot be ascertained without reference to some such distinction,
even if legal scholars or political scientists (adept or otherwise) find

45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 286 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., Phila.,
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866).
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 382 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., Phila.,
J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866).
47. 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 579 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
48. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX (“In the government of this
Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers,
or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either
of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them:
to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”).

623

2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2018 2:26 PM

2017

the distinction unhelpful or confusing. That is why Chief Justice John
Marshall could say, without embarrassment: “The difference between
the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the
executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law . . . .” 49 It is
also why Alexander Hamilton could say of the federal judiciary that it
has “neither FORCE [the executive power of enforcement] nor WILL
[the legislative power to prescribe norms], but merely judgment.”50
There is a core set of functions allocated to each power. This core is
sufficient to generate the principle of legality within the context of
the Constitution.
Whatever doubts there may be at the margins of each power, the
legislative power is the power to prescribe norms for the governance
of society. That power operates against a baseline of customs and
practice, which one might call general law; the legislative power,
within its enumerated scope, can clarify, qualify, or alter the general
law. Hence, as Chief Justice Marshall straightforwardly noted, “the
legislature makes . . . the law.” 51 The “essential” function of the
executive power, as the name suggests, is to execute the laws. 52 Sai
Prakash’s and Steve Calabresi’s encyclopedic accounts of executive
power under the Constitution demonstrate at least this much. 53
Similarly, the essence of judicial power is the power (and duty) to
resolve disputes within the court’s jurisdiction according to governing
law. 54 In the words of James Wilson: “The judicial authority consists
in applying, according to the principles of right and justice, the
constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the

49. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 575 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1866).
51. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 46.
52. See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 701.
53. See SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Prakash, supra
note 52.
54. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY passim (2008).
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manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties
interested in them.” 55
The principle of legality flows naturally from these allocations of
power. There must be law for the executive to execute. There must be
law for the judiciary to construe and apply. That law can come from
statutes or from the general law, 56 but law there must be. Execution,
construal, or application without law simply lies beyond the
enumerated scope of executive and judicial power whenever that
execution, construal, or application deprives subjects of rights. One
does not need a due process of law clause to generate this principle of
legality. It follows from—or, rather, is baked into—the nature of the
powers granted to executive and judicial agents by the Constitution.
To be sure, the President has some powers that can be effectuated
without reliance on law from other sources, such as the pardon
power 57 or the power to convene Congress on special occasions. 58 But
those powers do not involve the deprivation of legally protected rights
to life, liberty, or property and thus do not implicate the principle of
legality. By contrast, the President’s treaty-making power, shared with
the Senate, could implicate private rights. (Imagine, for instance, an
extradition treaty or a treaty limiting shipping rights.) But the treaty
power, as with the legislative power, is an express power to create new
norms, 59 which is why the Supremacy Clause lumps treaties with
statutes as “the supreme Law of the Land.” 60 When exercising the core
55. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 296 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). There
are surprisingly few other words from the founding era describing the judicial power. See James
S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998) (spending a
great many pages finding surprisingly few words on the subject). Nonetheless, Wilson’s brief but
potent account aptly sums up centuries of Anglo-American tradition. See HAMBURGER, supra
note 37, at 146–47.
56. It was determined early in the nation’s history that general law, as opposed to
statutory law, cannot support a federal criminal prosecution. See United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). This Article is agnostic on that issue as an original matter.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
58. Id. art. II, § 3. The federal courts, by contrast, have no enumerated constitutional
power beyond the “judicial Power” vested by Article III, save the power (which does not affect
private rights) to appoint inferior officers when Congress so prescribes. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
59. In my humble opinion, those new norms in treaties can only carry into effect other
enumerated federal powers, but that is a story for another day. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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“executive Power” to execute the laws, the President is bound by the
principle of legality. From 1788 to December 14, 1791, the President
could not, in the execution of the laws, deprive subjects of life, liberty,
or property except pursuant to the law of the land or a valid court
judgment. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause
confirmed this fact, 61 but it did not create or alter it.
Something both obvious and momentous emerges from this
analysis: the principle of legality, at least in its executive guise, is
substantive rather than procedural. It concerns what the “executive
Power” can do, not how or by what procedures it can do it. I will have
more to say about this rather large point shortly, but the next stop on
the journey concerns the judicial power.
III. NOTICE
When the term “due process of law” first appeared in an English
statute in the fourteenth century, the term was peculiarly concerned
with judicial action and required, inter alia, notice of suit by
appropriate writ: “That no man of what Estate or Condition that he
be, shall be put out of land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned,
nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer
by due process of law.” 62 This requirement of notice, which entails the
opportunity to present a case for one’s position (“without being
brought in answer”) before judicial deprivations of legally protected
interests, has survived to the present day. 63 While there can be lively
dispute about what forms of notice are adequate and what steps a
government must take to provide that notice, 64 the bedrock
requirement that some kind of notice be provided before a judicial
deprivation of property or natural liberty is a basic part of American

61. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1005, 1042 (2011) (“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . is essentially a restriction on what the
executive branch may do in the absence of a law.”).
62. See Jurow, supra note 8, at 266 (quoting 28 Ed. III, ch. 3 (1354)) (discussing the
writ-based origins of due process of law).
63. The interests protected under this statute of 1354, as with those identified in Magna
Carta, correspond quite well to the phrase “life, liberty, or property.”
64. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (deciding, in a 5–3 decision, that the
state needed to take additional steps to notify a property owner before a tax sale when mailed
notice was returned unclaimed).
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law and has spawned an entire body of jurisprudence under the Due
Process of Law Clauses. 65
The key point is that notice is a basic part of American law—so
basic that it pre-dated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause. Notice is part and parcel of what it means to exercise “judicial
Power” and did not need articulation in the Fifth Amendment to be
required. In 1830, in Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 66 the Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning of a Kentucky circuit court:
[B]y the general law of the land, no court is authorised to render a
judgment or decree against any one or his estate; until after due
notice by service of process to appear and defend. This principle is
dictated by natural justice; and is only to be departed from in cases
expressly warranted by law, and excepted out of the general rule. 67

The permissible departures and exceptions mentioned in the decision
concerned in rem proceedings in which the seizure of property was
deemed (however artificially) to be constructive notice of the action
and statutes providing for notice by publication in limited
circumstances. In all events, some kind of notice is an essential
precondition to the exercise of “judicial Power”: “[T]he service of
process, or notice, is necessary to enable a Court to exercise
jurisdiction in a case; and if jurisdiction be taken where there has been
no service of process, or notice, the proceeding is a nullity.” 68 The early
cases announcing the notice requirement did not rely on the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. No one, to my knowledge,
has ever had the cheek to suggest that the notice requirement did not
exist between June 6, 1788, and December 15, 1791. Rather, when
federal courts were granted the “judicial Power” in 1788, a notice

65. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1850).
66. Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 466 (1830).
67. Id. at 472.
68. Lessee of Walden v. Craig’s Heirs, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 147, 154 (1840).
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requirement came with the kitchen. 69 Anything about notice
contained in the Fifth Amendment was redundant.
IV. PROCEDURAL FORMS
Much of what we know today as due process law consists of the
prescription of procedural forms for various actions by executive and
judicial agents. What kinds of hearings must be held, and at what point
in the legal process must they be provided before someone may be
deprived of life, liberty, or property (whatever those terms turn out to
mean)? Cases on these questions fill volumes, and books and articles
on the subject fill shelves. The law of “procedural due process” infuses
courses in constitutional law, administrative law, federal courts, and
civil procedure, among others. What does the Constitution of 1788
say about these matters?
The Constitution expressly says relatively little about the
procedural forms of federal governmental action. It says a great deal
about the procedures to be employed in selecting the individuals who
will serve as the various agents of the federal government, but once
those agents are selected, the Constitution mostly goes silent about
how they must do their jobs. The big exception is the detailed
specification of procedures for exercising the legislative power (and
the hard-to-classify presidential presentment power that accompanies
it). The Constitution says quite a bit about the hoops that one must
jump through in order to produce something that can be called a
“law.” 70 It says much less about the hoops that one must jump through
in order to exercise the “executive Power” or the “judicial Power.”
Indeed, it says essentially nothing about how the President should go
about the task of law execution, beyond the procedurally unhelpful
injunction to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 71 The
procedures for exercising judicial power are expressly constrained only
by a provision for trial by jury in criminal cases 72 and a provision

69. Notice is seemingly less of an issue with respect to the “executive Power.” No one
expects a suspect to be given notice before the police show up to arrest him or her.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
71. Id. art. II, § 3.
72. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
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specifying a few evidentiary procedures for treason trials. 73 And
looming over the grand silence is the provision authorizing Congress
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.” 74 Were all procedural questions about
federal executive and judicial power thus left by the Constitution
to statute?
Notwithstanding the apparent silence, the Constitution actually
says many profound things about the proper exercise of executive and
judicial power. It does so in precisely the same way that it imposes the
principle of legality on executive and judicial agents: through the
Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses.
Start with the procedural forms of judicial action. There was no
reason for the Constitution to specify the form by which federal courts
may act because that was so well understood that it was simply part of
the “judicial Power” with which federal courts were vested.
Federal courts can act only in a judicial manner, “through the
traditional processes of the law, consisting of regular criminal or
civil proceedings.” 75
It is maddeningly hard to pin down through references to
founding-era sources what these “traditional” processes of law entail.
Conceptually, distinguishing judicial from executive power is
notoriously difficult, if only because of the historical origins of judicial
power as an aspect of executive power. 76 Even distinguishing judicial
from legislative power is more difficult than might appear at first
glance. 77 Historically, court systems prior to the Constitution were
many and diverse, so specifying, in essentialist fashion, the particular

committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.”).
73. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”).
74. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
75. HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 173.
76. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 103–
06 (1995).
77. See John Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 CONST. COMMENT.
295 (2016).
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features of a “judicial” process from pre-constitutional practice is no
easy feat.
Nonetheless, the founding generation took for granted that there
were established forms for the exercise of the judicial power that
constituted part of the legal backdrop of the era. Consider the
Judiciary Act of 1789. It went into considerable detail about the
jurisdiction of the various federal courts that it established but said
considerably less about the manner in which that jurisdiction would
be exercised. Rather, it incorporated existing and well-understood
practices as part of the background content of the judicial power.
Federal courts were authorized to issue writs “agreeable to the
principles and usages of law.” 78 They could demand the production of
evidence “by the ordinary rules of processes in chancery.” 79 The forms
of proof and evidence were to be “as of actions at common law.”80
And an immediately succeeding statute said that equity and admiralty
processes were to be “according to the course of the civil law.” 81 In
the founding era, there was no need to specify in detail precisely how
federal courts were to carry out their constitutionally vested function.
Everyone knew what a judicial process looked like. 82
There could, of course, be minor variations in procedures among
courts, but if certain essential features were not present—such as
notice, a right to be heard, an independent adjudicator, principles of
evidence, and (at least in common law and criminal cases) a jury—
then one simply was not dealing with an exercise of the “judicial
Power.” Indeed, a mass of materials in the early years of the republic
equated due process of law with judicial process. A prayer for relief at
the end of a court pleading asked “that justice, by due process of law,
may be done, in this case.”83 Statutes used the phrase “due process of
law” as shorthand for judicial process. 84 Corporate charters identified

78. An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat.
73, 82.
79. Id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 82.
80. Id. § 30, 1 Stat. at 88.
81. An Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 94.
82. See Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due”, 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
83. See, e.g., Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 24 (1795).
84. See, e.g., Auld v. Norwood, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 361, 363 (1809) (citing a Virginia
statute on fraudulent conveyances).
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“due process of law” (presumably through quo warranto proceedings)
as the mechanism for abrogating the charters. 85 There was no need for
the Fifth Amendment in 1791 to tell courts that they could not
deprive people of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Due process of law just was, in an existential sense, what courts did
when they were doing their jobs properly. 86
That leads to what, at least from the standpoint of modern
doctrine, appear to be the most difficult questions of all in the area of
due process: What happens when executive officials rather than courts
are the agents of deprivation? What procedures must executive agents
follow in order to deprive someone of life, liberty, or property? Surely
there was not the same well-understood set of practices in the
founding era that were necessary for valid exercise of the “executive
Power” as there was for “judicial Power.” How would one know a
procedurally appropriate executive deprivation of life, liberty or
property when one saw it?
These questions, which are the central inquiries of modern due
process doctrine, all derive from a fundamental mistake. They assume
that executive procedures determine, or are even relevant to, the
lawfulness of an executive deprivation of life, liberty, or property. They
do not and are not, unless valid statutes prescribe necessary procedures
that must be followed. The simple fact is that executive agents cannot
validly deprive someone of life, liberty, or property without legal
authorization, in which case it is the law doing the depriving, or
pursuant to a valid judicial order, in which case it is the judicial order
that is doing the depriving, no matter what procedures are employed.
The executive power, one must recall, is an implementational
power. It can validly act to deprive subjects of rights only when there
is law to enforce: a valid statute, a norm from the general law, or a
valid court judgment. That is the essence of the principle of legality.
Executive procedures, even highly formal, court-like executive
procedures, may or may not be a good idea, and they may or may not
serve any number of functions, but they cannot legitimate a
deprivation that is not otherwise legitimate. And an executive

85. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 689 (1819).
86. See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 157 (“The common law had its own ideals about
the personnel, structure, and mode of proceeding of its courts—ideals that could be summed up
as the due process of law.”).
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deprivation that is anything more than the implementation of a valid
statute, general law norm, or court decision is illegitimate. Due
process of law requires either legislation, general law, or a court
judgment for a deprivation of protected rights. No amount of
executive procedures can substitute for these things. That is the
substantive import of the principle of legality.
Because the rise (and rise) of the administrative state tends to skew
thinking on these matters, for purposes of ascertaining original
meaning, it is important to keep clear several basic facts that make this
conclusion less dramatic—or at least less dramatic to an eighteenthcentury audience—than it might seem today.
First, and most importantly, a great deal of executive action does
not involve the deprivation of any subject’s life, liberty, or property
and thus does not implicate the principle of legality that helps define
the “executive Power.” Philip Hamburger usefully distinguishes
executive action that deprives legally protected rights, or that
constrains subjects, 87 from executive action that exercises coercion against
non-subjects such as aliens, 88 exercises coercion pursuant to
enforcement of statutory duties without purporting to add any
independent binding authority to the statute, 89 administers benefits
such as pensions or public land grants, 90 or engages in other activities
such as notice-giving, interpretation, or internal executive
administration, none of which alter the legal landscape for subjects. 91
For all of these non-constraining, or non-rights-depriving, actions,
legally required procedures are determined by statute or executive
discretion rather than by constitutional command in all but the most

87. See id. at 2–5.
88. See id. at 192–93. Nathan Chapman has recently argued that notions of due process
apply fully to aliens as a matter of original meaning. See Nathan Chapman, Due Process Abroad,
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2920776. Nothing in this Article turns on whether he is right. As with everything else
pertaining to due process of law, the answers to questions of extraterritorial application of due
process of law likely turn on the scope of the powers granted by the Constitution of 1788 rather
than on the words of the Fifth Amendment. There is much to be said for Professor Chapman’s
view that those powers are limited regardless of their objects, but that is a tale for another time.
89. See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 84–85, 215–17.
90. See id. at 193–98.
91. See id. at 85–95.
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extreme cases that implicate fiduciary principles. 92 Outside of a
fiduciary-based zone of arbitrariness, executive agents have a wide
choice of procedures when they are not constraining subjects, limited
only by legislation that is “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” federal powers. If no subjects are being deprived of life,
liberty, or property, the Constitution is not much interested in what
kinds of procedures executive agents employ for whatever they are
doing. That is true under modern Fifth Amendment due process
doctrine, which kicks in only when there is a deprivation of “life,
liberty, or property,” and it was true under the original Constitution
as well, from 1788 onwards.
The difference between original law and modern law in this
respect concerns the scope of interests whose deprivation is deemed
to raise constitutional concerns. The demise of the right-privilege
distinction that was formalized in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth 93 heralded the extension of due process of law norms to the
deprivation of all sorts of things, from government jobs to welfare
benefits to licenses, that would fall under the administration-ofbenefits heading in earlier times. 94 The story of that extension is for
another time, 95 as is any assessment of its wisdom. For present
purposes, all we need to know is that, from the perspective of original
meaning, executive action raises constitutional issues (apart from
violations of fiduciary duties in extreme cases) only when it deprives
rights—or, to put it another way, when it constrains subjects. That is
a relatively modest subset of executive action.
Second, and relatedly, in the course of engaging in executive
action that does not deprive rights or constrain subjects, executive
actors can often employ procedures that make their activity look very
similar to legislative or judicial action. They can employ adjudicative
procedures in fact-finding and the application of law to fact that look
very similar to court proceedings, and they can employ rulemaking
procedures that make executive rule-pronouncing activity seem very
92. Executive agents, as with all federal governmental actors, have a fiduciary duty of
care, and that duty limits the extent to which wholly arbitrary or inappropriate procedures can
be employed in any tasks. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 44, at 131–35.
93. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972).
94. The “earlier times” persisted until the 1950s. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46,
57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
95. For a brief introduction, see LAWSON, supra note 7, at 853–927.
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much like legislation. But as long as the outputs of these proceedings
do not constrain subjects, none of this matters for constitutional
purposes. Whether executive action implicates the principle of legality
depends upon the substance of the executive action, not on what
procedures the executive agents employ.
Third, much executive action that appears to deprive people of
rights or to constrain subjects actually does no such thing. Consider a
prosecutor’s decision to pursue criminal charges. If the defendant is
charged and deprived of liberty pre-trial, it is because of legislative
action that arguably makes the conduct criminal and judicial action
validating the arrest. If the defendant is convicted and sent to prison,
it is the product of a judicial order of conviction pursuant to the
statute. If the executive agent chooses not to prosecute, that is simply
a dispensation, just as a decision to prosecute does not create any new
liability that did not previously exist. You are not deprived of anything
because an executive agent fails to grant you a favor to which you have
no legal entitlement. Put another way: there is no violation of the
principle of legality when an executive agent applies the law to you.
Any deprivations are not really the result of executive action, in the
sense that the executive action does not itself create any of the legal
norms that result in the deprivation. The executive agent merely acts
in accordance with statutes (the law of the land) and judicial orders
(the judgment of his peers). The principle of legality does not prevent
executive actors from acting. It prevents executive actors from
depriving subjects of rights without law to back it up. The execution
of valid laws or judicial orders that effect deprivations is not itself a
deprivation without due process of law forbidden by the principle
of legality.
Fourth, the foregoing considerations raise a question of timing in
some situations. Even where deprivations are authorized by statute in
principle, there are circumstances in which executive actors inevitably
deprive persons of legally protected rights without a prior
determination by a court that the deprivation is authorized. Consider
a naval vessel on the high seas that is enforcing a wartime (or at least
time-of-hostilities) embargo on shipping involving enemy ports. The
officer commanding the naval vessel believes that he has found a ship
in violation of the embargo. This is the late eighteenth or early
nineteenth century, so timely communication from ship to shore is not
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an option. 96 Must every naval vessel come equipped with an Article III
judge on board to determine the lawfulness of seizures on the spot?
One can replicate the same concerns, with less dramatic effect, in more
mundane settings on land. Arrests of criminal suspects present some
time lag between a deprivation of liberty and an adjudication of
probable cause, much less of guilt. Do these actions violate the
principle of legality?
The answer depends on whether the deprivation is authorized by
statute or general law. If the naval officer seizes goods that violate an
embargo, there is no violation of the principle of legality because the
officer has acted in accordance with the statute, assuming that the
statute is valid and the officer complies with both the substantive and
procedural terms of the statute. If a person is detained by arrest and is
guilty of the charged crime, there is no violation of the principle of
legality because the deprivation is authorized by the law of the land,
again assuming that the criminal statute is itself valid. And if a health
inspector summarily seizes and destroys chickens in a warehouse on
the ground that the chickens violate valid health regulations, there is
no problem if the chickens are, in fact and law, unhealthful and if the
legislature had power to regulate the healthfulness of chickens.97
Obviously, if the underlying statutes exceed the power of the
legislature and are therefore unconstitutional, they provide no
authorization for actions of enforcement. An agent who enforces an
unconstitutional law acts without legal authorization and thus violates
the principle of legality. But an agent who executes a constitutional
law does exactly what the “executive Power” is supposed to do.
How would one determine whether those factual and legal
predicates for valid executive action are present? The ordinary
mechanism for obtaining that determination would be an action for
damages, in a proper court, against the executive actor. Conceivably,
one could try to bring an action for injunction if one knows that the
deprivation is coming; and if the expected deprivation is of life or
liberty, there is a chance that one will succeed in an injunction action
because the remedy at law will likely be inadequate. A tort suit by
one’s surviving family is not really an adequate remedy for an unlawful
96. The example is based on Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
97. The example is adapted from North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago,
211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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execution, and a tort action for wrongful imprisonment does not quite
do the trick for an unlawful detention. If the expected deprivation is
of property, however, there is no obvious reason, in most cases, why a
damages remedy is not adequate, or at least as adequate as a damages
remedy is for any legal wrong, 98 so damages it will likely be.
Those familiar with the history of administrative law know that,
until relatively recently, suing for damages was precisely the
mechanism by which the legality, including the constitutional legality,
of executive action was typically challenged. In Little v. Barreme 99 in
1804, for example, Captain Little seized goods on the high seas from
a ship sailing from a French port pursuant to a presidential directive
to naval officers to be wary of goods heading to and from France
during the quasi-war of that time. Unfortunately for Captain Little,
Congress had authorized seizure only of goods sailing to, and not
from, French ports. Captain Little got sued, and even though he was
acting under presidential orders, the statute did not actually authorize
the executive action. Captain Little accordingly faced a significant
judgment for damages. 100
Today, this mechanism is largely unavailable in practice because of
the rise (and rise) of the doctrine of official immunity, which removes
the strict liability for unlawful action that prevailed during the
founding era. 101 For now, it is sufficient to note that the rise (and rise)
of the administrative state has left many casualties in its wake, and the
doctrine of executive accountability is among the many. From the
standpoint of original meaning rather than modern doctrine, damages
actions are the vehicle for dealing with problems of timing. Executive

98. See, e.g., Cruickshank v. Bidwell, 176 U.S. 73 (1900) (denying an injunctive remedy
against a customs collector where a damage remedy was available). If the lost property is real
property (rather than tea, as in Cruickshank), there may be reasons to doubt the efficacy of a
damages remedy, which is why contracts for land are generally specifically enforceable.
99. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170.
100. Id. at 179. He was bailed out by a private bill. See Act for the Relief of George Little,
ch. 4, 6 Stat. 63 (1807). This kind of indemnification was, perhaps unsurprisingly, evidently
fairly common in the founding era. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs
and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 (2010). For more on Little v. Barreme, see infra note 102 and
accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–19 (1982).
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agents can deprive without prior court determinations all they want,
but they do so at their legal peril. 102
The Constitution of 1788 has very strong ideas about the nature
of executive power and how it must be implemented. Those ideas are
substantive, not procedural. They concern what executive power is
and what executive power can do, not what kind of hearings executive
agents choose to provide. To the extent that those ideas are replicated
in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, that clause
embodies a very strong principle of what can meaningfully be called
substantive due process. Yet unlike modern substantive due process, it
is not about limits on legislative action; it is about limits on executive
action. But it is most definitely about substance.
Where this all went wrong in the case law—to the point where
emphasis on the forms of executive hearings and other procedures
came at the expense of the principle of legality—is a lengthy story for
another time. But a few brief observations on where the key missteps
might have happened are appropriate here.
The Supreme Court’s first encounter with the principle of legality
of which I am aware, though it did not use that terminology, was Little
v. Barreme, and the court’s analysis seems consistent with the analysis
herein. In finding that executive action contrary to law—even in time
of conflict, on the high seas on a naval vessel, and pursuant to
presidential directives—was invalid and thus provided no defense of
legal authorization against a common-law damages action, Chief
Justice Marshall wrote:
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the
opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not give
a right, they might yet excuse from damages. I was much inclined to
think that a distinction ought to be taken between acts of civil and
those of military officers; and between proceedings within the body
of the country and those on the high seas. That implicit obedience
which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors, which
indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system, appeared
to me strongly to imply the principle that those orders, if not to

102. Does this mean that pre-modern law enforcement officials acted at their peril if they
arrested people without judicially-approved warrants? Of course it does—subject to the proviso
that law enforcement officials are themselves a relatively modern development. See Jerome Hall,
Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566 (1936); Roger
Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685 (2001).
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perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person whose general
duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his country
in a situation which in general requires that he should obey them. I
was strongly inclined to think that where, in consequence of orders
from the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized with pure intention,
the claim of the injured party for damages would be against that
government from which the orders proceeded, and would be a
proper subject for negotiation. But I have been convinced that I was
mistaken, and I have receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in
that of my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change
the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those
instructions would have been a plain trespass. 103

The law is the law, and executive orders or proclamations cannot
change it. So far, so good.
The next federal judicial landmark in the application of the
principle of legality, with a more mixed prognosis, came more than
half a century later in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co. 104 The case involved a statute that, upon first glance
(and second glance as well), appears to be an extraordinary assertion
of governmental power. The Supreme Court’s opinion does not
reproduce the text of the statute, but that text merits reproduction
(omitting some portions involving sureties and notice of sale that are
not relevant here):
[I]f any collector of the revenue, receiver of public money, or other
officer who shall have received the public money before it is paid into
the treasury of the United States, shall fail to render his account, or
pay over the same in the manner, or within the time required by law,
it shall be the duty of the first comptroller of the treasury to cause to
be stated the account of such collector, receiver of public money, or
other officer, exhibiting truly the amount due to the United States,
and certify the same to the agent of the treasury, who is hereby
authorized and required to issue a warrant of distress against such
delinquent officer and his sureties, directed to the marshal of the
district in which such delinquent officer and his surety or sureties
shall reside . . . ; therein specifying the amount with which such
delinquent is chargeable, and the sums, if any, which have been paid.

103. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179.
104. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856).
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And the marshal authorized to execute such warrant, shall, by
himself or by his deputy, proceed to levy and collect the sum
remaining due, by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of such
delinquent officer; having given ten days’ previous notice of such
intended sale . . . ; and if the goods and chattels be not sufficient to
satisfy the said warrant, the same may be levied upon the person of
such officer, who may be committed to prison, there to remain until
discharged by due course of law. . . . And the amount due by any
such officer as aforesaid, shall be, and the same is hereby declared to
be, a lien upon the lands, tenements, and hereditaments of such
officer and his sureties, from the date of a levy in pursuance of the
warrant of distress issued against him or them . . . . And for want of
goods and chattels of such officer, or his surety or sureties, sufficient
to satisfy any warrant of distress issued pursuant to the provisions of
this act, the land, tenements, and hereditaments of such officer . . .
may and shall be sold by the marshal of such district or his deputy;
and . . . shall give a valid title against all persons claiming under such
delinquent officer, or his surety or sureties. 105

Considering just this section of the statute (and another section
will prove important in a moment), the law represents a legislative
instruction to executive agents to seize and sell a person’s property,
and where necessary to imprison the person, without a prior judicial
determination of liability. And, yes, people were actually imprisoned
under this statute. 106 The relevant treasury agents under this law have
the mandatory duty to issue and enforce the appropriate distress
105. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 107, § 2, 3 Stat. 592, 592–93.
106. See Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558). The case
involved a naval purser whose account was found deficient. A marshal found insufficient property
to satisfy the debt and had Randolph imprisoned. Randolph brought a habeas corpus action,
raising broad-based challenges to the constitutionality of the Act of May 15, 1820, under, inter
alia, Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Chief Justice Marshall, who heard the case on
circuit along with district judge Philip Barbour, took the Article III argument very seriously:
The persons who are directed by the act of congress to ascertain the debt due from a
delinquent receiver of public money, and to issue process to compel the payment of
that debt, do not compose a court ordained and established by congress, nor do they
hold offices during good behaviour . . . . They are, consequently, incapable of
exercising any portion of the judicial power, and the act which attempts to confer it,
is absolutely void.
Id. at 254. Both judges avoided the constitutional questions by construing the statute not to
apply to Randolph, albeit for somewhat different reasons. See id. at 251–52 (Judge Barbour
construing the statute not to allow reopening of accounts); id. at 254–55 (Chief Justice Marshall
construing the statute not to extend to pursers).
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warrants. Issuance of a warrant not only makes possible the
aforementioned deprivations of liberty and property but also, in the
event of a deficiency, imposes liens on property and authorizes judicial
sales that divest title from all other claimants. All of this is set in motion
by executive action determining the existence and amount of a
deficiency without recourse to the courts.
Section four of the statute brings the judiciary into the picture;
any who think themselves aggrieved by a distress warrant can seek an
injunction against the warrant in federal court. 107 But the catches to
this judicial review provision are (1) that the person seeking an
injunction must initiate the action and then post a bond, indicating
that the burden of proof is on the claimant, and (2) that even the
issuance of an injunction against enforcement action under a distress
warrant does not “in any manner impair the lien produced by the
issuing of such warrant.” 108
Taken as a whole, this procedure looks like exactly the kind of
executive action that both the principle of legality and Article III of
the Constitution are designed to prevent. Under this scheme,
executive agents can sell people’s property and imprison them on the
agents’ own say-so. Subsequent judicial determinations, even in favor
of the party opposing the warrant, do not cancel out all of the legal
effects of the distress warrant because they leave in place the lien on
the collector’s property. 109 The plaintiffs in Murray’s Lessee, who
asserted a claim under a common-law levy of execution that pre-dated
the judicial sale under the distress warrant but post-dated the

107. § 4, 3 Stat. at 595.
108. Id.
109. Whether the requirements of initiation of judicial action by the target of the warrant
and posting of a bond, by themselves, render the scheme potentially a violation of the principle
of legality is a more difficult question. I am inclined to think that they do, since they give a
presumptive legal effect to the executive action, but the law has been consistently contrary to
my position. See, e.g., McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877) (“It can hardly be necessary
to answer an argument which excludes from the definition of due process of law all that
numerous class of remedies in which, by the rules of the court or by legislative provisions, a party
invoking the powers of a court of justice is required to give that security which is necessary to
prevent its process from being used to work gross injustice to another.”).
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imposition of a lien under the statute, made these constitutional
arguments against the statute with gusto. 110
From the standpoint of the principle of legality, the obvious
response to these arguments is that they are arguments against a
statute, not against executive action taken of its own accord, and that
the executive action was thus entirely in accord with the law of the
land. Congress specified the executive procedures in this statute in
gruesome detail. It made application of the statute mandatory on the
treasury. The statute dictated, in painstaking fashion, exactly how
warrants must be issued, enforced, and executed. The executive agents
who issued distress warrants against the collector in this case followed
the statute to the letter. 111 Factually, no one disputed that the
collector—the infamous Samuel Swartwout—had swindled the
government out of more than one million dollars. 112 No one claimed
that the executive agents had exceeded their statutory authority or
gone after the wrong person. Isn’t that exactly what the principle of
legality demands, and isn’t that exactly what this proceeding delivered?
If the statute itself was constitutionally valid, then the answer has
to be “yes.” Deprivations pursuant to constitutional statutes are
lawful, provided that the statutes’ substantive and procedural
prescriptions are followed. The primary question in Murray’s Lessee
was thus not really whether the executive action was constitutional but
whether the statute that authorized, and indeed mandated, the
executive action was constitutional as a law “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” federal powers. 113 While the opinion by
Justice Curtis in Murray’s Lessee covered a lot of territory—some of
it unsound as we will see—at one point, it settled on exactly the
right analysis:
Among the legislative powers of congress are the powers “to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and
provide for the common defence and welfare of the United States,
to raise and support armies; to provide and maintain a navy, and to

110. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
272–73 (1856).
111. See id. at 275 (“No objection has been taken to the warrant on account of any defect
or irregularity in the proceedings which preceded its issue. It is not denied that they were in
conformity with the requirements of the act of congress.”).
112. One million dollars in 1839 would have been a big deal even for Dr. Evil.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution those powers.” What officers should be appointed to
collect the revenue thus authorized to be raised, and to disburse it
in payment of the debts of the United States; what duties should be
required of them; when and how, and to whom they should account,
and what security they should furnish, and to what remedies they
should be subjected to enforce the proper discharge of their duties,
congress was to determine. In the exercise of their powers, they have
required collectors of customs to be appointed; made it incumbent
on them to account, from time to time, with certain officers of the
treasury department, and to furnish sureties, by bond, for the
payment of all balances of the public money which may become due
from them. And by the act of 1820, now in question, they have
undertaken to provide summary means to compel these officers—
and in case of their default, their sureties—to pay such balances of
the public money as may be in their hands.
The power to collect and disburse revenue, and to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into
effect, includes all known and appropriate means of effectually
collecting and disbursing that revenue, unless some such means
should be forbidden in some other part of the constitution. The
power has not been exhausted by the receipt of the money by the
collector. Its purpose is to raise money and use it in payment of the
debts of the government; and, whoever may have possession of the
public money, until it is actually disbursed, the power to
use those known and appropriate means to secure its due
application continues. 114

To be sure, while this is the right analytical approach, I am not at
all certain that this is the right answer. That is, I am not at all certain
that prescription of this particular executive procedure, including the
power to imprison the debtor, is a valid exercise of Congress’s power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause—unless one can say, and one
might well be able to say, that accepting the position of collector
amounts to a waiver of any constitutional claims that one might
otherwise have. 115 Quite possibly, Article III requires judicial action in
order for any person to be imprisoned pursuant to federal law, at least
114. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281.
115. The idea that one could waive claims sounding in due process of law was settled by
1857. See Bank of Colom. v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243–44 (1819).
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outside of executive action in war zones pursuant to the law of war.116
I am saying only that the Court in Murray’s Lessee hit upon the right
analytical approach. The Court considered the right questions
regardless of whether it reached the right answers.
The Court was thus correct, but only in a backhanded sense,
to say:
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any
process which might be devised. The . . . [Due Process of Law
Clause] is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and
judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to
leave congress free to make any process “due process of law,” by its
mere will. 117

The first sentence is correct, but the second is far off-base. It is not
really the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause that
constrains the federal legislative power in this regard, but rather the
enumerations of legislative power in the Constitution. If those powers
do not allow Congress to pass a statute empowering the executive in
a particular fashion, then executive action under that statute is
unauthorized. Invoking the Due Process of Law Clause rather than
the doctrine of enumerated powers for this purpose is a conceptual
mistake, unless the claim is that due process of law contains more limits
than do the enumerated powers.
At the very least, in any instance in which Congress exceeds its
enumerated powers, it is a mistake to turn to the Due Process of Law
Clause rather than those enumerations as the source of the limitation.
And, quite possibly, this particular conceptual mistake is what set the
law down the wrong path of thinking of the Due Process of Law
Clause as (1) a source of procedural rather than substantive constraints
on the executive and (2) an independent source of substantive
constraints on the legislature. Neither use is an obvious manifestation

116. For the same reasons, I have long been dubious about any inherent congressional
power to imprison for contempt. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)
(unpersuasively allowing such a power).
117. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
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of the principle of legality. The latter use, however, may have a nonobvious connection to due process of law, to which we now turn.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE LEGALITY?
Through the scheme of enumerated powers, the original
Constitution limits the substance of what executive agents can do by
requiring that executive agents act pursuant to valid law. It is easy to
see how “due process of law” makes reference to this idea. The
Constitution also limits the power of Congress through the
enumeration of limited legislative powers that are “herein granted.” If
Congress enacts a statute that exceeds its enumerated powers, the
statute cannot serve as valid law to authorize executive or judicial
deprivations of rights. Conceivably, one might try to describe the
enactment of such a statute itself as a violation of due process of law,
even if Congress followed the procedures laid out in Article I, Section
7. If that description is some kind of interpretative error, it appears to
be harmless. If the statute really exceeds Congress’s enumerated
powers and is therefore unconstitutional, nothing of substance is
lost—or gained—by layering on a claimed violation of due process of
law. Violating two constitutional provisions or principles is not worse
than violating one; the action is unconstitutional in either case. If one
wants to reflect the principle of enumerated powers in the Due Process
of Law Clause and call it a kind of “substantive due process,” it is hard
to see what difference that will make. 118
But what “substantive due process” usually means these days is a
limitation on legislative powers that goes beyond a straightforward
enumerated powers violation and that does not implicate any express
restriction on legislative power found in the Constitution. Is there
118. Nonetheless, I am doubtful, as a conceptual matter, whether that is an appropriate
use of “due process of law.” Article I, Section 7 declares to be “law” anything that clears its
procedural hurdles. The language “shall be a law” suggests that those procedures are both
necessary and sufficient to give the label “law” to entities that emerge from such a process. The
reason that such “laws” do not satisfy the principle of legality by authorizing valid executive or
judicial action is that they are superseded by a hierarchically superior form of law—the
Constitution—that binds executive, judicial, and legislative actors alike. Norms that lose out to
other norms in a conflict-of-laws duel can still be laws. If Congress passes an unconstitutional
statute, and the Constitution is amended to validate the statute, Congress does not need to reenact the statute. It was law from the beginning. Accordingly, I would not call enactment of an
unconstitutional law a “due process of law” violation.
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room in an originalist account of the Constitution for any such thing,
from whatever source and however labeled?
The originalist answer, perhaps surprisingly to some, is yes. And
the answer of “yes” goes beyond what Professors Chapman and
McConnell have in mind when they say that Congress
cannot act in an essentially “judicial” or “executive” fashion
directly to deprive people of rights.119 It includes at least some
instances in which Congress violates the Constitution by passing
“prospective and general laws . . . [that are] enforced by means of
impeccable procedures.”120
The Constitution is, most fundamentally, a fiduciary instrument.
By that I do not mean that, as a matter of either private obligation or
political theory, it represents a valid transfer of authority from some
persons to others. I simply mean that, as a descriptive matter, the
Constitution falls most naturally into a family of documents known to
eighteenth-century persons as fiduciary instruments. A book-length
argument for this proposition can be found elsewhere. 121 The
significance for due process of law is that fiduciary instruments carry
in their wake a number of background interpretative rules, derived
from the various rights and duties that accompany fiduciary
relationships as a default. One of the most basic fiduciary duties is a
duty of care on the part of the agent. The agent must exercise
authority on behalf of the principal with some measure of attentiveness
and skill. To the extent that Congress is seen as a fiduciary agent, a
duty of care accompanies all of its grants of power. At a minimum, this
duty grounds something like a “rational basis” review of congressional
action for arbitrariness. At a maximum, it imposes even more
stringent requirements of reasonableness. The detailed case for these
propositions is set out elsewhere. 122
Could one read this duty of care into the Due Process of Law
Clause so that action that falls below the standard of that fiduciary
duty lacks due process of law? To the extent that the Due Process of
Law Clause includes enumerated-powers limitations on Congress,

119. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 2, at 1677–79.
120. Id. at 1679.
121. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 44.
122. See Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and
the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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there is no reason to exclude this limitation—which, after all, is simply
an implicit but nonetheless quite real limitation on the granted
enumerated powers. If one wants to call this fiduciary principle
“substantive due process,” no great consequence ensues even if such
a move is interpretatively unsound.
Whether that move from fiduciary duty to due process of law is
interpretatively unsound depends on whether the idea of due process
of law has application to legislative action. The Supreme Court said
yes in Murray’s Lessee in 1856, at least with respect to legislation that
changes traditional procedural forms. The next year, in the Dred Scott
decision, 123 the Court went the full distance to use the Due Process of
Law Clause to invalidate a substantive law regulating slavery in federal
territory. 124 Before that time, as a historical matter, there was
something of a back-and-forth about the extent to which ideas of due
process of law applied to legislation. 125 Because there is no reason to
suppose that anything contained in “due process of law” as it might
apply to legislation would impose different or stricter requirements
than do background fiduciary principles, nothing in the present
analysis depends on the resolution of that controversy, and I
accordingly pass it over. Whatever can plausibly, or perhaps even
implausibly, be read into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause with respect to congressional action is already contained in the
Constitution of 1788.
This Article, which is an attempt to uncover the original meaning
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, could end right
123. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
124. The Court said:
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws,
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
Id. at 450. The big problem with this argument is the premise that Congress has no enumerated
power to regulate slavery in federal territory. Congress has power under the Territories Clause
to prescribe rules for the governance of federal territory, and that includes the power to declare
certain forms of property contraband. Even without such a declaration, the mere absence of
positive law providing affirmatively for slavery would be sufficient to end a slave relationship
upon entry into such territory, since slavery was purely a creature of positive law and the Fugitive
Slave Clause by its terms has no application to federal territory. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.
3. More detailed thoughts on Dred Scott can be found elsewhere. See GARY LAWSON & GUY
SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 197–201 (2004).
125. See MOTT, supra note 27, at 98–101, 123, 141–42.
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here. Perhaps it should end right here. It might, however, be valuable
to consider why and how the contemporary meaning of “due process
of law” has strayed so far from its original meaning, so that instead of
talking about the principle of legality and enumerated powers, or even
fiduciary duties, we today mostly talk about hearings, oral
proceedings, cross-examination, and other procedures. For that part
of the story, which I tell with some reluctance, we move to the second
half of the nineteenth century.
VI. POST-BELLUM DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The death knell for a sound understanding of due process of law
in the Fifth Amendment was probably the Civil War and the ensuing
rise of the administrative state in the Progressive Era. Doctrinally and
historically, the Fifth Amendment was effectively deranged by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The ensuing discussion of post-Civil War case law must be read
with a great deal of caution. The purpose of the discussion is to locate
in the evolution of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine some reasons
why Fifth Amendment doctrine strayed so far from its original
meaning. A discussion of that kind makes some assumptions about
doctrinal development that are difficult to defend. It assumes (1) that
Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine was built from the prior
Fifth Amendment doctrinal foundation, (2) that there was some kind
of feedback mechanism through which Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine could affect Fifth Amendment doctrine, and, most
importantly, (3) that case-law development under either clause was in
fact driven by doctrinal considerations rather than policy. As Nettie
Woolhandler pointed out in a dead-on comment to a draft of this
Article, one might well be able to explain the entire history of
Fourteenth Amendment due process development solely by reference
to the rise of the administrative state, with no role necessary for the
kinds of doctrinal machinations described below. Nonetheless, I offer
the following account as suggestive of one possible contribution to
the development of modern doctrine, with no accompanying claim
about the strength of that contribution. I suspect that the influence of
these doctrinal considerations was more than zero, but I cannot prove
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it, and a reader who puts down the Article at this point is
easily forgiven.
Up through 1868, for reasons that have already been discussed at
length, it was possible to pay no serious attention to the language of
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. The clause added
nothing of substance to constitutional discourse, and its use in
doctrine, as Murray’s Lessee and Dred Scott graphically illustrate, was
more likely to lead to confusion than to correct interpretation. It was
in many respects a blessing that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
of Law Clause was not often invoked. But that relative neglect of the
Due Process of Law Clause meant that, prior to the Civil War, there
was no body of established federal case law construing the clause.
There was a great deal of state case law interpreting various due process
of law or law of the land clauses in state constitutions, 126 but there was
nothing of note at the federal level. As late as 1877, the Supreme
Court could say “that the constitutional meaning or value of the
phrase ‘due process of law,’ remains to-day without that satisfactory
precision of definition which judicial decisions have given to nearly all
the other guarantees of personal rights found in the constitutions of
the several States and of the United States.” 127
When the Court made this observation in 1877, it made it in the
context of a second due process of law clause that had been added to
the Constitution less than a decade beforehand. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

126. See Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST.
COMMENT. 339, 346–59 (1987).
127. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1878); see also id. at 103–04 (“It is
not a little remarkable, that while this provision has been in the Constitution of the United
States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for nearly a century, and
while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers of that government have been
exercised has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its
branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum or
the more enlarged theatre of public discussion.”).

648

2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

611

1/10/2018 2:26 PM

Take the Fifth . . . Please!
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. 128

While there was little reason up to that point to invoke the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause against a limited federal
government, whose scheme of enumerated and separated powers
already included everything plausibly attributable to the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, there was plenty of reason
to invoke the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against all manner of actions of state and local
governments, especially after the central substantive provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment was eviscerated in the Slaughter-House Cases
in 1873. 129 And that is precisely what happened. Even by 1877, the
Court could complain:
[W]hile it has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the
power of the States, only a very few years, the docket of this court is
crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold that State courts
and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law. 130

The Court at that point could not easily escape pronouncing on the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause.
Nor was it clear, from the standpoint of original meaning, what those
pronouncements were supposed to say.
It is very clear what “due process of law” means in the context of
a limited government of constitutionally separated powers that is
already subject to the principle of legality. It is much less clear what
“due process of law” means in the context of governments that are
not otherwise subject to the Constitution’s enumeration-of-powers
and separation-of-powers schemes. The Constitution of 1788 says
almost nothing about how state governments must be structured. It
does mandate that every state have a “Republican Form of
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Slaughter-House Cases
are beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the weight of modern originalist
scholarship suggests that the cases wrongly, and much too narrowly, construed the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under
State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 73 (2008).
130. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 104.
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Government,” 131 and in several places the Constitution assumes that
states will have traditional governmental structures that include
legislatures, 132 executives, 133 and courts, 134 but that is all; there is little
reason to think that the Constitution was understood in 1788 to
impose specific structural rules on state governments short of
prohibitions on monarchy or direct Athenian-style democracy. 135
There is nothing to suggest that Massachusetts must understand
“executive” or “judicial” powers to be exactly what the federal
Constitution envisions them to be. If, however, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause means the same thing as
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, and if the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause means the separation-ofpowers-inspired principle of legality, does the Fourteenth Amendment
thereby impose a specific separation-of-powers regime on the states by
constitutional command?
The Court in 1877 in Davidson v. City of New Orleans suggested
as much:
But when, in the year of grace 1866 [sic], there is placed in the
Constitution of the United States a declaration that “no State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law,” can a State make any thing due process of law which, by its
own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this is to hold
that the prohibition to the States is of no avail, or has no application
where the invasion of private rights is effected under the forms of
State legislation. It seems to us that a statute which declares in terms,
and without more, that the full and exclusive title of a described piece
of land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would,

131. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
132. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 4; id.
art. VI, cl. 2.
133. See id. art. IV, § 4; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
134. See id. art. VI, cl. 2–3.
135. Do state referenda violate the Guarantee Clause? Quite possibly yes; I hope to explore
the subject in future work.
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if effectual, deprive A. of his property without due process of law,
within the meaning of the constitutional provision. 136

This passage makes perfect sense with respect to the national
government. Congress has no enumerated power to shift land titles
from A to B. Perhaps it could be done by authorizing an exercise of
the power of eminent domain, but (1) just compensation would have
to be provided to A and (2) it was quite doubtful at that time, and as
a matter of original meaning, whether the federal government actually
had a power of eminent domain to exercise. 137 A court could
accomplish the task if there was substantive law prescribing the shift
in titles, but not otherwise. The executive similarly could not act
without law. One would not need the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
of Law Clause to conclude that Congress cannot declare the property
of A to be the property of B. One need simply examine the
enumerated powers of Congress and find none that does the trick and
then apply the most basic form of the principle of legality that has any
application to legislation. Even in federal territory, where Congress
has the powers of a general government, its exercise of those powers
is limited by fiduciary duties, which would make a straight-up transfer
of land from A to B, without anything more, very difficult to defend.
When one moves to state governments, however, matters are very
different. Without the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no obvious
federal constitutional prohibition against a state law taking property
from A and giving it to B. The federal Constitution does not empower
state governments, so it does not function for them as a source of
fiduciary duties. 138 The federal Constitution does not create or limit
the institutions of state governments, so it does not impose upon them
the principle of legality through a scheme of separated powers. It is
quite possible that every state’s own constitution prohibits taking
property from A and giving it to B. It is quite possible (and I would
say true) that natural law forbids it. It is remotely possible, I suppose,
that a “Republican Form of Government” is incompatible with that
136. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1878).
137. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 44, at 94–96; William Baude, Rethinking the
Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738 (2013).
138. There are modest exceptions, dealing with such matters as federal elections and
federal constitutional amendments, and in those limited settings, the federal Constitution
imposes fiduciary duties on the states. That has nothing to do with the kind of legislation with
which due process of law cases have been concerned.
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kind of naked act of title transfer, though I would have to be
convinced by evidence that I have never seen that the eighteenthcentury concept of republicanism goes to that degree of substance as
well as form. The original, pre-Civil War federal Constitution simply
was not designed to police all manner of state mischief. It polices only
very specific forms of state mischief, and transfers of title from A to B
implicate those kinds of mischief only when they impair the obligation
of contract. 139
How might the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment change
things? The Court in Davidson in 1877 did not really explain how the
Due Process of Law Clause would invalidate a legislative act of title
transfer, though it assumed that it would do so. There are several
possible grounds for such an assumption. One is to say that the Due
Process of Law Clause is a font of natural law and prohibits A-to-B
transfers for that reason. That is not an impossible position to defend
by any means, 140 and this Article is officially agnostic on whether that
is a good account of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original
meaning. 141 Alternatively, perhaps the Court was saying that undoing
vested property titles is a judicial function and therefore cannot be
directly performed by the legislature. Maybe the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause forbids state legislatures
from engaging in activities that are “in their nature” judicial or
executive. Again, this is not an impossible position to defend, 142 and it
might even be correct in many states as a matter of state constitutional

139. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
140. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536–37 (1884); Gedicks, supra note 17;
Sandefur, supra note 26.
141. To be sure, such a position is in some tension with the Constitution’s uniformly
positivist account of what makes something “law.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Harrison,
supra note 11, at 530–32; Hyman, supra note 82, at 16. This positivist account, in which even
unconstitutional statutes are “law” if they are enacted pursuant to the procedures in Article I,
Section 7, poses no problem for judicial (or executive) review. Constitutional review is premised
on choice-of-law concerns; the Constitution is hierarchically superior to statutory law if there is
a conflict between the two. See Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against
Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 8 (2007). That is entirely consistent with the
hierarchically inferior source still being law in a meaningful sense.
142. Cf. David A. Martland, Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of
Executive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1675 (1985) (arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires separation of executive and judicial powers).
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law. 143 To derive such a norm from the federal Constitution, however,
is an extraordinary result that one would expect to have generated
more interest than has yet emerged. 144 Nonetheless, it appears to be
the most plausible interpretation of the Davidson decision—and even
a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause once one treats the Fourteenth Amendment
clause as equivalent to the Fifth Amendment version. The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause embodies the principle of
legality, which includes, in the context of the Fifth Amendment, a
substantive account of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. If the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process of Law Clauses really
mean exactly the same thing, then it follows fairly readily that all state
governments must conform to the basic separation-of-powers scheme
imposed on the federal government by the Constitution’s three
vesting clauses. On this account, states can deprive people of life,
liberty, and property only through governmental institutions that
conform in substance to the federal model of separated powers.
If that seems to be an unlikely account of what “due process of
law” means in the context of state governments under the Fourteenth
Amendment (and it certainly seemed unlikely to the courts that
developed due process doctrine in the nineteenth century), then what
else might “due process of law” mean in that context? One perfectly
143. Could the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause mean nothing more
than that states must obey their own internal norms of separated powers, essentially making state
constitutional violations matters of federal law? There is nothing in the nature of things to rule
out such a notion. But due process of law duplicates compliance with the rest of the Constitution
for federal actors because of the contents of the federal Constitution. The Constitution’s scheme
for federal actors just happens to contain all of the norms plausibly embodied by due process of
law. If that was not so, a due process of law clause would not be redundant. Maybe the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause absorbs this fact and just accepts anything
that a state chooses to do in its own constitution, but that is not a reading that leaps forth from
the page.
144. Any such claims are non-starters as a matter of doctrine. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187
U.S. 71, 83–84 (1902) (“A local statute investing a collection of persons not of the judicial
department, with powers that are judicial, and authorizing them to exercise the pardoning power
which alone belongs to the governor of the state, presents no question under the Constitution
of the United States. The right to the due process of law prescribed by the 14th Amendment
would not be infringed by a local statute of that character. Whether the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons
or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert
powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the
determination of the state.”).
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sensible option is to give up trying to relate the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment clauses and simply take the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process of Law Clause as an independent interpretative entity.
There is much to be said for this approach. While there was little
federal case law interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clause in 1868, there was, as we have already noted, a fair amount
of state law interpreting related provisions in state constitutions.
Perhaps the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clause lies in those state cases, which would presumably have no
relevance to the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment clause that
has its own history and context. 145 If that is the right answer, and it
might very well be the right answer, this Article has concluded.
But suppose that one is, for reasons either of interpretation or
doctrine, committed to the idea that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ Due Process of Law Clauses must be harmonized at
least in principle measure, if not treated as lock-step identical in
meaning. Then one has to come up with some way to give content to
the Fourteenth Amendment provision in light of the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment provision. What kind of account of original
meaning would make sense on those assumptions?
In the context of the original Constitution, “due process of law”
essentially refers to the principle of legality and thus requires executive
and judicial actors to ground their deprivations of life, liberty, or
property in law. 146 The text of the Constitution then limits the manner
by which those deprivations can take place by actors who are granted
enumerated “executive” or “judicial” powers, respectively. It is not
easy to apply this notion to state governments that are not formally
constrained by the Constitution’s separation-of-powers norms. What
if a state wants its courts or executive agencies to function essentially
as legislatures? What if it wants the highest court in the state to be the
most numerous branch of the state legislature? If due process of law

145. I take this to be one of Professor Eberle’s key points. See Eberle, supra note 126.
146. Because the focus here is on the development of procedural due process doctrine, I
am setting aside the possibility that due process of law functions as a constraint on the substance
of legislation.
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does not forbid these structural arrangements (if it does, we ended the
discussion three paragraphs ago), what might it do?
A possible answer is to say that so long as the state legislature is
the relevant actor, federal notions of due process of law mostly drop
out of the picture (subject, perhaps, to a Murray’s Lessee qualification
for laws that change traditional legal forms too much and perhaps to
a “rational basis” or “arbitrariness” check on substance). When the
relevant state actor is judicial, the traditional forms of judicial process,
which were as well known in 1868 as they were in 1788 and 1791,
must be followed. But what happens when the relevant state actor is
executive? That is where the rise of the administrative state makes
its entrance.
State legislatures sometimes choose to act by vesting a measure of
discretion in other actors, effectively letting those other actors make
law. Rather than set railroad rates themselves, which they could do
without violating the principle of legality (though any particular act
might violate a host of constitutional provisions, both state and
federal), state legislatures sometimes choose to create executive
commissions that will find facts and set rates for them. Rather than
prescribe and apportion taxes, which they could do without violating
the principle of legality (though any particular tax might violate a host
of constitutional provisions, both state and federal), they sometimes
choose to create boards that find facts and fix and apportion the taxes
for them. As state governments took on increasingly complex
regulatory tasks in the nineteenth century, especially concerning such
matters as railroad transport and irrigation, this strategy of
delegation of legislative authority to executive commissions acquired
considerable appeal.
A pure separation-of-powers understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause might forbid the delegation
outright, on the ground that executive actors can perform only
executive functions. But once that version of due process of law has
been dismissed as implausible in the context of state governments
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the permissibility of the
delegation is purely a matter of state law. Some states might choose to
forbid their legislatures from passing off their powers, but others
might permit it.
If a state legislature delegates tax-setting or rate-setting authority
to an agency or commission, it is effectively allowing the agency or
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commission to deprive people of property. Presumably, the legislature
could affect the particular deprivation in question directly without
violating the Due Process of Law Clause. (On the other side of the
coin: if a particular deprivation is for some reason substantively invalid,
it is hard to see how it could become valid by virtue of legislative
delegation.) If the legislature sets a general norm, the default
assumption would be that the norm must be applied in the courts,
through ordinary judicial processes that conform to the model of due
process of law. In those circumstances, any deprivations occur only
through and after due process of law in the strongest sense of that
term. The interposition of an agency or commission, however,
changes the field. The deprivation no longer occurs through court
processes, nor does it happen through the direct action of the
legislature. The executive actor, in this scenario, is making rather than
enforcing law by hypothesis. Couldn’t one see the minimum content
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause as a
constraint on this kind of executive action, given that the principle of
legality is first and foremost concerned with executive action that
makes its own law to enforce?
That is precisely the move that was made, sometimes directly and
sometimes indirectly, by many of the post-Civil War due process of law
cases. The Court suggested this result in Spencer v. Merchant, 147 which
held that the legislature could fix and apportion the tax itself, 148 but
noted in dictum that “[w]hen the determination of the lands to be
benefited is entrusted to commissioners, the owners may be entitled
to notice and hearing upon the question whether their lands are
benefited and how much.” 149 The price charged by the Court in this
analysis for delegation by state legislatures is the imposition of

147. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345 (1888).
148. See id. at 356. Well, maybe not quite. Relying on the prior decision in Davidson, the
Court added the qualification: “If the legislature provides for notice to and hearing of each
proprietor, at some stage of the proceedings, upon the question what proportion of the tax shall
be assessed upon his land, there is no taking of his property without due process of law.” Id. at
355–56. The legislature did not have an entirely free hand.
149. Id. at 356.

656

2.Lawson.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

611

1/10/2018 2:26 PM

Take the Fifth . . . Please!

procedural requirements when legislative power is exercised by
executive agents.
This delegate-your-legislative-power-and-lose-your-proceduralfree-ride doctrine gained steam in 1890 in Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad and Warehouse
Commission. 150 The Minnesota legislature delegated to a railroad
commission the power to determine whether railroad rates are unfair
or unequal, to set fair and equal rates, and to force those rates on the
railroads through mandamus actions. As construed by the Minnesota
courts, determinations of (un)fair or (un)equal rates by the
commission were not judicially reviewable. 151 Explained the Court:
This being the construction of the statute by which we are bound in
considering the present case, we are of opinion that, so construed, it
conflicts with the Constitution of the United States in the particulars
complained of by the railroad company. It deprives the company of
its right to a judicial investigation, by due process of law, under the
forms and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive
ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in
controversy, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, the
action of a railroad commission which, in view of the powers
conceded to it by the state court, cannot be regarded as clothed with
judicial functions, or possessing the machinery of a court of justice.
. . . No hearing is provided for, no summons or notice to the
company before the commission has found what it is to find and
declared what it is to declare, no opportunity provided for the
company to introduce witnesses before the commission, in fact,
nothing which has the semblance of due process of law . . . .
. . . The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for
transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the
element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as
regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation,
requiring due process of law for its determination. 152

Here we have a full-blown theory of “procedural due process”
recognizable in its broad outlines to modern eyes. When legislatures

150. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n,
134 U.S. 418 (1890).
151. See id. at 456.
152. Id. at 456–58.
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delegate their power to make law, the Court seems to say that they
must delegate that power to courts or, at the very least, to executive
agencies that employ judicial-like procedures. The principle of legality
thus morphed into a junior-varsity non-delegation doctrine that does
not actually forbid state legislative delegations but requires judicial, or
judicial-like, proceedings to substitute for legislative judgment. 153
There is, of course, a big difference between judicial proceedings
and judicial-like proceedings. The latter can take place within
executive agencies, and while they may have many of the trappings of
judicial proceedings, such as notice and hearing, they will not
necessarily have all the bells and whistles, such as an impartial
adjudicator and, most conspicuously, a jury. 154 If the legislature
delegates authority to an executive agency or commission (or perhaps
corporation), does it satisfy late nineteenth-century notions of due
process of law if the agency provides notice and a right to some kind
of hearing, short of full-blown judicial determinations?
The Court’s unsurprising answer was yes. As was explained in
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 155 an important late
nineteenth-century case that was understood to be a test case for the
many irrigation districts springing up throughout the western states:
The legislature not having itself described the district, has not
decided that any particular land would or could possibly be benefited
as described, and, therefore, it would be necessary to give a hearing
at some time to those interested upon the question of fact whether
or not the land of any owner which was intended to be included
would be benefited by the irrigation proposed. If such a hearing were

153. I am not the first person to focus on the importance of legislative delegation in these
cases. See Matthew J. Steilen, Due Process as a Choice of Law: A Study in the History of a Judicial
Doctrine, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1086 (2016); Ann Woolhandler, Delegation and
Due Process: The Historical Connection, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 223. Professor Woolhandler
emphasizes a distinction between cases involving rate-setting and tax assessments, finding that
the latter were really the origins of what we now call procedural due process. See id. at 234–38.
She may very well be right about that as an historical matter. By the end of the nineteenth
century, however, any such distinction had effectively disappeared.
154. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
155. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
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provided for by the act, the decision of the tribunal thereby created
would be sufficient. 156

Here the assumption was that irrigation districts, which paid off their
bonds by levying assessments against property within the districts,
were valid only if the assessments on land bore some relationship to
the benefits to that land. If facts regarding those assessments were
going to be determined by executive agents rather than legislatures or
courts, there had to be hearings of some kind at the agency level. 157 It
is incidental to this story that the assumption of a requirement of
rough proportionality, which had teeth for a while, 158 soon gave way
to a more deferential view of the state’s assessment power. 159
The idea that some executive procedures of notice and hearing,
even if they do not approach the full magnificence of a common-law
judicial trial, are both necessary and sufficient to validate executive
exercises of delegated legislative authority found perhaps its definitive
statement in one of the most famous of the post-Civil War due process
of law cases. In Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 160 the Court
faced the then-latest in a long line of cases challenging state tax
assessment mechanisms under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process of Law Clause. 161 Colorado gave its local governments unusual
autonomy, though that did not seem to make a difference in the
decision. The Denver City Council sent out tax bills to local property
owners to pay for street paving. There were numerous irregularities in
the process leading up to those tax bills; as Professor Steilen aptly
remarks, “One catches a distinct whiff of corruption.” 162 None of that,
however, raised a federal constitutional claim. The landowners
opposing the tax bills got their case into federal court by claiming, as

156. Id. at 167.
157. On the important connection between the integrity of fact-finding and judicial
requirements of procedure, see Woolhandler, supra note 153, at 235–41.
158. See Vill. of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278–79 (1898).
159. See French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901) (limiting, by a 6–3
vote, the holding in Norwood).
160. Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
161. For an epic-length summary of the nineteenth-century cases, see Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., 181 U.S. at 328–45. For a briefer overview of the highlights, see Steilen, supra note
153, at 1079–85.
162. Steilen, supra note 153, at 1087.
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was factually true, that they had never had the opportunity for an inperson meeting with the City Council, presumably to see if the city
council members were willing to lie to their faces (as they seemed quite
willing to lie in written documents). “From beginning to end of the
proceedings the landowners, although allowed to formulate and file
complaints and objections, were not afforded an opportunity to be
heard upon them.” 163 They were allowed to file pieces of paper with
the city council but nothing more, and the city council wildly
misrepresented those filed papers in its written issuances. 164 In nowfamous language, the Court both reiterated its delegation-based
theory of due process of law and held that some kind of oral
proceeding was necessary under the facts of this case:
In the assessment, apportionment and collection of taxes upon
property within their jurisdiction the Constitution of the United
States imposes few restrictions upon the States . . . . But where the
legislature of a state, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to some
subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount,
and upon whom it shall be levied, and of making its assessment and
apportionment, due process of law requires that at some stage of the
proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer
shall have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice,
either personal, by publication, or by a law fixing the time and place
of the hearing. . . .
If it is enough that, under such circumstances, an opportunity is
given to submit in writing all objections to and complaints of the tax
to the board, then there was a hearing afforded in the case at bar.
But we think that something more than that, even in proceedings
for taxation, is required by due process of law. Many requirements
essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in
proceedings of this nature. But even here a hearing in its very essence
demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support

163. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385.
164. The city council averred, in approving the tax assessments, that “no complaint or
objection has been filed or made against the apportionment of said assessment . . . but the
complaints and objections filed deny wholly the right of the city to assess . . . .” Id. at 384–85.
This was transparently false. See id. at 382.
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his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof,
however informal. 165

Here we have the familiar foundations of modern due process law. The
key element is now the kinds of procedures that executive agents
employ, not whether the executive agent complies with the principle
of legality. The move from substance to procedure is complete.
To carry the story to the present day, one would have to stop at
many stations. There is the station, seven years later, at which Justice
Holmes, who had dissented in Londoner, wrote for a majority in BiMetallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization 166 that
generalized, rather than site- or block-specific, taxation does not
require any kind of notice or hearing—an idea that has translated into
the doctrine that agency rulemakings of sufficient generality are not
subject to due process analysis. 167 One would have to trace how the
delegation element in this analysis dropped out of sight, leaving the
post-Civil War due process framework applicable to all state and local
executive deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.” 168 One would
need to track through the process by which the content of “life,
liberty, or property” came to include government benefits, again vastly
expanding the universe of actions subject to due process scrutiny. One
would need to explore how the procedural requirements of this
expanded universe morphed from a vague but emphatic requirement
that agencies provide whatever procedures are fair under all of the facts
and circumstances of the particular case into a three-factored
utilitarian calculus. 169 Most pertinently to this project, one would need
to see how this framework that developed under the Fourteenth
Amendment became applicable, through a kind of reverseincorporation, to federal agency action under the Fifth Amendment.
After all, if the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clauses must mean the same thing, then doctrine developed to
deal with the peculiarities of state executive action will also become
applicable to federal administrative action. This, of course, entails a
165. Id. at 385–86.
166. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
167. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347–48 (6th Cir. 2017).
168. For a good start to the telling of this part of the story, see Woolhandler, supra note
153, at 258–60.
169. Two co-authors and I have traced that particular development in prior work. See
Lawson et al., supra note 9.
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gross misinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause, shearing it entirely free of its roots in the principle of legality
and the original Constitution’s provisions and structure.
It is beyond this project to say whether it would be a good or bad
thing to have a due process doctrine in which the Fifth Amendment
provision means simply the principle of legality (and is entirely
redundant for that reason) while the Fourteenth Amendment
provision has a very different application—whether that different
application be modern law, the delegation-based doctrine of the late
nineteenth century, a hard requirement of state compliance with
separation of powers, or something completely different grounded in
antebellum state case law, it is unnecessary to say here. My goal has
been only to explore the original meaning—or, rather, nonmeaning—of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause and
to suggest how the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
generated problems whose answers, as a matter of original meaning,
are very far from obvious, but whose effect on the Fifth Amendment
have been profound. Even if modern doctrine will not de-couple the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that de-coupling is essential to
recovery of the former’s original meaning.
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